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The history of Portugal is a slightly neglected field of national history. However, the 
analyses of the Portugal-Hungarian diplomatic relations (1935-1944) throw light on 
several questions, which are problematical for the Hungarian historiography up to the 
present day. 
The lecture is based on Hungarian documents of Foreign Office found in the Magyar 
Országos Levéltár (Hungarian National Archive) on the one part and documents of the 
Lisboan Hungarian Royal Legation collected by György Bakach-Bessenyey on the other 
part It can be seen from this that I have made my analyses from the Hungarian point of 
view because I have not carried out research into the documents of the Lisboan National 
Archives. 
In my short essay, I am going to make typologies about the Portugal-Hungarian 
diplomatic relations in that time, and I draw attention to three problems: firs of all, why 
were Portugal revalued from the second half of the 1930's, secondly, what kind of talks 
was between the Anglo-Saxon powers and Hungary in Lisbon beside Stockholm, Bern 
and Istanbul and thirdly, what was the relation of the Kállay-goverament towards to 
Washington and London through the Hungarian Legislate in Lisbon. 
Thus, the Hungarian-Portugal diplomatic relations enframe the Hungarian-British and 
the Hungarian-American relations, too, in this period. Thereby, the history of connections 
is going to expand by the title. 
The diplomatic relations between Hungary and Portugal became stronger in the second 
half of the 1920's, for which one of the reasons was that the foreign policy of Hungary 
expanded, and the Portuguese government led by Oliveira Salazar made a serious interest 
towards the Horthy régime. 
The connection between the two countries first was taken up on economic level. The 
two countries made an arrangement with each other in 1929, which was the first contract 
and it was about the first export-import agreement, which refers to the exchange of wine 
of Tokaj and Porto.1 The prelude of this was in 1924 that the Portugal government pointed 
out that she wanted to make an economic contract with Hungary. The agreement of 1929 
broadened further ; the Ipari Árukiviteli és Behozatali Rt. (Industrial Export-import Ltd.) 
exported a considerable amount of goods from Portugal, for example mucilage, 
1 Magyar Országos Levéltár (Hungarian National Archives: MOL) K70 336, bunch (cs.) without 
number (szn.) item (t.) 1929. 11. 14. document 
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turpentine, fish-oil and cod-liver-oil. At the same time these goods came to Hungary by 
Swiss and German traders with 30-40% value higher than they were bought. To eliminate 
this came into force the new barter agreement in 1942 December to the extent of 6 million 
dollars. Among the Hungarian exports the paraffin, vaseline, textiles, medicines and 
photographic papers represented the biggest volume.2 The agreement was ratified in 
January 1943 by the government of Salazar and the Hungarian Executive Council.3 It can 
be seen that the economic relations between the two countries became much stronger at 
the end of the 1920's, which coincided with Salazar's rise to power in Portugal and a new 
political constellation was taking shape in Europe. 
The main foreign political aim of the Hungarian policy was the French and British 
orientation until the middle of the 1920's. There were important changes in Europe from 
the beginning of the 1930's. Hitler came into power in Germany and she broke the 
barriers of the Versailles peace treaty, in this England did not support her but she had 
scruple over the German revision and she closed her eyes. At the same time, Germany 
followed its expansive foreign policy in the second half of 1930's. There were dangers 
ahead of the British Empire from different sides, in the Far East there was the Chinese-
Japanese war, in the Middle East the Palestinian conflict. The British foreign policy was 
attentive to her interests and she followed her reconciliation policy in Europe and walked 
out from Middle-Eastern Europe. With this, she gave ground to the aggressive Germany, 
which took the advantage of this and annexed Austria and the Sudeten-land from 
Czechoslovakia. The German presence increased in Eastern Europe and Hungary found 
herself in the shadow of the extended German Reich. In the constellation of changed 
balance of power, the Hungarian foreign policy turned to Berlin with Rome, since she 
could hope for putting into effect her revision aims from these two powers. The British 
presence was still in Europe and they still had to count on it ; the leaders of the Hungarian 
diplomacy knew it well and watched the British government with great interest not only 
from London, but from England's oldest European ally, Portugal. Pál Hevesy, accredited 
chargé d'affaires in Lisbon thought this: "No one can talk about independent foreign 
policy, because Portugal defacto the colony of England. 'A One month later he wrote this: 
"The protecting arm of Portugal is England in the future too. Without putting too much 
emphasis on Portugal I dare point out that the aspect from political and League of Nation 
but especially from economical aspect this country can mean a definite value for 
Hungary, particularly if the good relations -with her are kept. "5 
For the Hungarian foreign policy Lisbon meant a political channel to England, from 
where the Hungarian diplomats were able to follow the events in London with attention. 
It can be seen that during the second part of the 1930's Hungary and Portugal greatly 
draw closer to each other ; it is confirmed by several facts: in 1935 István Csáky П. class 
chargé d'affaires was replaced by Andor Wodianer I. class chargé d'affaires as a deputy. 
The Hungarian Royal Legation opened its doors under the direction of Andor Wodianer, 
2 MOL K70 336. es. szn. t 1942. 12. 30. doc. 
3 MOL K69 726. es. szn. t 1943. 01. 27. doc. 
4 MOL K63 225. es. 26. t 36.1. (1930. annual summing report 1931. 06. 28.) 
5 MOLK63 225. cs. 26. t 42.1. (1931. 07. 29.) 
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Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, in 1939, who fulfilled this post until 19 
March 1944. At the same time, the Portugal legation was transferred to Budapest from 
Vienna, with the diplomatic order, in 1939 ; it was led by Sampaio Carrido, Envoy 
Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary. At the time of Anschluss, Germany annexed 
Austria, and this, of course, had an influence, but it is fact that the Portugal legation was 
placed to Budapest and reflects the approach of the Portugal government towards 
Hungary. What is the reason for this? Salazar probably looked on with great sympathy to 
the Horthy regime, which was certainly similar to his regime. The mutual sympathy was 
made stronger by Miklós Horthy, when he sent the Hungarian Great Cross of Merit to 
Salazar.6 At the beginning of the 1930's Gyula Gömbös made an attempt to establish the 
one-man dictatorship in Hungary. He sent the summary of his political programme -
National Working Plan - to Salazar (which was translated to Portuguese by Pál Teleki, 
and some of its points kindled his interest.7 These probably influenced the decision of 
Salazar to move the diplomatic legation to Budapest. According to the documents of the 
Hungarian legislate of Lisbon, the tasks of the Hungarian diplomats were not only to 
watch the domestic and foreign policy of Portugal, but to analyse and send the coming 
information from London to Budapest. 
The diplomatic importance of Lisbon grew further by 1940-41, insomuch as Portugal 
took a stand on neutrality. A new legation was opened in Lisbon in January 1941, and 
higher ranked ambassadors replaced the forgoing ones ; Switzerland, Finland and Sweden 
appointed their ambassadors also.8 The leaders of the Hungarian diplomacy also raised the 
number of the Lisboan mission. The change of the memorials between Pál Teleki and 
Oliviera Salazar was at this time also - 4 March 1941. Teleki, in his letter, outlined the 
overwhelming dominance of Germany and he invoked Salazar's aid to make approaches 
to the British government Salazar made a promise to take on this mediation between 
Great-Britain and Hungary, and he expressed his opinion about concerning the three 
possible ways of ending the war. The first variation is that England will win ; the second 
variation is that England will sign peace with Germany, which means Stalin's victory and 
according to the third possible variation Germany will win the war, which means that the 
hegemony of Hitler's "New Europe" and the hegemony of Germany-Italy will be 
realized.9 
It can be said that the importance of the European diplomacy of Portugal had grown on 
account of the neutrality of Portugal, which was sensed by the Hungarian foreign policy 
and it took the necessary steps. But the position of Portugal during the Second World War 
should not be overestimated, it is merely that the invisible frontline ran along Lisbon, 
where diplomats and secret agents were the soldiers. On the other hand, it meant the 
possible channel for exchanging the views between the Hungarian foreign policy and the 
powers of the Anglo-Saxons. 
6 MOL K63 225. cs. 26. t 128.1. (1934. 10. 18.) 
7 MOL K63 225. cs. 26. t. 115.1. (1933. 06. 07.) 
8 MOL K63 225. cs. 26. t szn. (1941. 01. 10.) 
9 MOL K63 226. cs. 26. t szn. (1941. 03. 04.) 
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There were significant changes in the military position at the end of 1943 and at the 
beginning of 1943. The German army suffered a defeat in Russia, the Hungarian second 
army lied in its ruins, the Anglo-Saxons successfidly set their foot on the shores of North-
Africa (Operation Torch) ; all these events forced the Kállay-government that Hungary 
must revalue its relation with Germany and must take into account the possible defeat of 
Germany, too. The representative of the accredited Polish government to Lisbon, colonel 
Kowalewsky, had already drew Wodianer's attention, in M y 1942 (!), that "it would be 
practical for someone to be in Lisbon on part of the Hungarians, with whom preliminary 
talks could be started. " I0 In favour of this the Hungarian government took the necessary 
steps. Miklós Kállay sent Tibor Eckhardt, representative of Small Holder's Party, to the 
United States to take steps in establishing an emigrant government, and to form a 
connection with Washingtóa In a parallel direction with this the exploratory talks started 
towards to the Anglo-Saxon powers. The Hungarian efforts found preferential welcome 
from the British side. Kowalewsky indicated, who also gave warning to Wodianer in 
December 1942, that there was a great interest towards Hungary in the circles of the 
Anglo-Saxons.11 
As it is known, the peace-feelers of the Kállay-government towards the Anglo-Saxons 
during 1943 took place in Lisbon, besides Stockholm, Istanbul and Bern. The Hungarian-
British negotiations in Stockholm and Istanbul were processed by Gyula Juhász, who took 
the documents of the Foreign Office as a basis.12 While István G. Vass outlined the 
negotiations with the American representatives in Bern.13 The Hungarian-British 
connections were taking place in Lisbon and we can only reconstruct this, and we have 
only had few information about the Hungarian-American connection, because the 
compromising document were destroyed after March 1944, so were the documents of the 
armistice negotiations respecting Lisbon. After György Bakach-Bessenyey collected some 
parts of the bequest of Wodianer, which was brought back to Hungary not long ago, 
further researches can be carried out14 
In the focus of the English foreign policy for the planes of Middle-Eastern Europe 
there was a conception to create a confederation, which could have several imaginable 
alternative forms: a Polish, Czechoslovak, Hungarian, Croatian confederation or a Danube 
confederation. The British government counted on this plan as a real possibility until the 
end of 1943. At the same time they also had to consider their anti-German allies' 
demands, which were reconciled on talks. The leaders of the American diplomacy rather 
10 MOL K63 116. es 26/1. t. 174.1.(1941.07. 10.) 
11 MOL P2066 19. doboz (d.) 23.1. 
12 JUHASZ Gyula, Magyar-brit titkos tárgyalások 1943-ban (Hungarian-British secret 
negotiations), Bp., 1978. 
G; VASS István, "Negotiations of György Bakach-Bessenyey with the delegates of the United 
States of America in Bem, between 28 August 1943 and 19 March 1944. Further documents of the 
peace-feelers of Kállay government" Bp., 1994, In : Levéltári Közlemények LXV. évf. 1-2. sz. 
(Különlenyomat). 
The György Bakach-Bessenyey 's son donated the documents to the Hungarian National Archives 
(MOL) in 1994, which is under the number of P2066 there. 
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judged the policy of Hungary for the quicker victory than the sphere of influence, while in 
the British policy the latter was to the fore. But they agreed on - in the beginning of 1943 
in Casablanca - in that they only accept the unconditional surrender of their enemies. On 
the contrary, the Kállay-government tied its political conditions to sign the armistice, such 
as to keep the reoccupied territories, and to save their existing political system and power. 
The events accelerated by September 1943, because Italy - Germany's main European 
ally - signed the truce agreement in September with the Allies. These made the British 
government to take immediate steps towards Hungary, as they thought that the Italian 
example would make the Hungarian leaders to take determined steps too. 
Mr. Gladhill, a member of the British embassy in Lisbon, sent an 8-point-demand to 
Wodianer in 18 September 1943, and by that 1., the British embassy is ready to receive a 
three-member delegate for the negotiations of the unconditioned surrender, 2., the leader 
must have a rank as a general, 3., they want complete secrecy, 4., the negotiation can be 
held in Ankara or other neutral European country, 5., the agreement is to be published 
when the British government finds it advisable, 6., until the actual armistice is not signed 
sabotage actions must be carried out, 8., if they are in treaty with someone else this 
message is objectless. Wodianer added that "Gladhill said that the 8th point is only valid 
for 48 hours" and continued "the only reason I answered this ordinary arrogant and 
annoying British message was that it came from a leading embassy of a Great power and 
because it contains positive suggestions, too, comparing with other, friendly, but less 
concrete suggestions."15 
Wodianer wrote this on 1st October 1943: "Any other hither or farther connections of 
us want to make negotiations with us. They also suggest that before we start the talks, we 
must not do anything, by which we would be compromised with the Germans. All of our 
connections agree in that the negotiations can be proceeded on the military level at the 
moment, and not on the political level, like the questions of the borders. "16 
György Ránki wrote in his book, 19 March 1944, that Wodianer said to Cambell, 
British ambassador in Lisbon, that generally the proposal can be accepted, but expressed 
his vindications about the formula of the unconditional surrender.17 We did not find any 
notes concerning this. With the date of 10 October, Wodianer was informed from 
Budapest that the treater in Istanbul, Dezső Újváry, speaks in the name of the Hungarian 
government and he has the authority to negotiate.18 In his report of 27 December, which 
was given by the British, Wodianer writes the following: "the political negotiations and 
the oral statements only have values until the military actions start [...] the military and 
other leaders must sign the surrender agreement, which includes the conditions of 
publication. "19 By all this, I suppose, that our knowledge of 1943's armistice negotiations 
have to be supplemented by the new accessible documents. 
15P2066 19. d. 56.1. 
16 P2066 19. d 45.1. 
17 RÁNKI György, March 19, 1944 (German occupation of Hungary), Kossuth Könyvkiadó, Bp., 
1968., p. 7-29 
18P2066 19. d. 67.1. 
!9P2066 19. d. 89.1. 
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The talks with the British government in December 1943 faded. However, the United 
States of America was still interested in Hungary. But at the same time, the Kállay-
government felt its position insecure and sent a huge amount of gold to Switzerland 
without the knowledge of the Prime Minister, Miklós Kállay, and there were three persons 
who disposed of this. This was the so called Kállay Disposal Fund, and the aim of this 
was to provide the financial basis of a possible emigrant government.20 I have already 
mentioned that Tibor Ekhardt travelled to the United States of America on account of 
organising and establishing the Hungarian government, where he met Ottó Habsburg, too. 
Ekhard and Ottó Habsburg tried to represent the Hungarian interests in the governmental 
circles, thus Ottó Habsburg made talks with Roosevelt in Quebec. Meanwhile, Ekhard 
thought about himself as the man who represents the official American point of view, 
which was denied by the American official statements. Ottó Habsburg kept the connection 
with the Hungarian legitimists via Lisbon through the mediation of archduke Róbert. Ottó 
Habsburg made a speech in Toledo, Ohio in November 1943, where he sketched his 
cabinet-making plans in Hungary but these did not fit in the British and American foreign 
policies' plans.21 Therefore a special agent, Ferenc Deák, was sent to Lisbon from the 
State Department to make connections with the Hungarian government, who was an 
officer of the Intelligent Service also. Ferenc Deák arrived in Lisbon in January 1944 and 
gave the memorandum of the United States of America to Wodianer, by which the two 
countries were active belligerents. If Hungary wants to turn the sympathy of Washington 
to herself, then she has two choices: gives precious information, which fastens the fall of 
Germany or makes an immediate war against Germany. Deák phrases like this "the 
American government wants to save Hungary from the Russian occupation and getting 
into the Russian's sphere of interest. "21 It is interesting, that via Deák the American State 
Department encouraged the Hungarian diplomacy in January 1944 to break off its 
relations with the British, because the Americans were more independent from the 
Russians than the British.23 
The Kállay-government passed information to Washington about the amount of 
German supplies, arms factories and airfields, which emerge from the documents. 
The relation between the Dísz Square and the State Department through Lisbon lasted 
until 19 March 1944, when the German troops occupied Hungary and she lost her 
sovereignty. Andor Wodianer resigned from his post after the German occupation and left 
for Buenos Aires. 
20 P2066 28. d. 1-67.1. 
21 MOLK63 227. cs. 26. t 508-515.1. (1943. 11. 20.) 
22 P2066 19. d. 91.1. 
23 P2066 19. d. 102.1. 
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Annex 
Diplomatic relations with Portugal: 9 February 1926. 
Hungarian Royal Legation: Madrid, San Sebastian, Lisbon 
The leaders of the Hungarian Royal Legation: from Madrid: Antal Magyary. 
chargé d'affaires (1926. 02. 09. - 1928. 02. 07.) ; Péter Matuska, chargé d'affaires 
(1928. 02. 07. - 1929. 04. 02.), then ambassador (1929. 04. 02. - 1930. 10. 31.) ; Pál 
Hevesy, chargé d'affaires (1930. 10. 21. - 1931. 12. 10.) ; Ferenc Marosy (Mengele), 
chargé d'affaires (1931. 12. 10. - 1933. 01. 01.) ; István Csáky, chargé d'affaires (1933. 
02. 10. - 1935. 04. 09.) ; Andor Wodianer, chargé d'affaires (1935. 03. 30. - 1938. 02. 
22 ). From San Sebastian: Andor Wodianer (1938. 02. 22. - 1939. 05. 08.). In Lisbon: 
Andor Wodianer (1939. 05. 08. - 1944. 03. 19.). 
Consulates: Lisbon, Porto 
The leaders of the Consulates: Eduardo da Silva Braga, Guilherme da Cuncha Reis, 
Antal Husum Károly, László Belányi, Artúr Baján 
Changing of the number of staff of the Hungarian Royal Legation (1941-1943) 
I В number of staff | 
Portuguese representatives accredited to Budapest: From Vienna: Alberto da 
Veiga Simões (1928. 06. 19. - ). Between 1936 and 1937 the post of the Envoy 
Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary was unfilled. In Budapest: Carlos de Almeida 
Sampaio de Carrido (1939. 11. 18.- 1944). 
Trading records: 
1., Trade agreement in Paris: 14 November 1929. 
Released: 1930. XXXII. Act. 
